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Abstract
Theory  makes ambiguous  predictions about the  effects of  of bank concentration  and financing obstacles is
bank concentration  on access to external  finance.  Using a  dampened  in countries with well developed  institutions,
unique data base for 74 countries of financing  obstacles  higher levels of economic  and financial  development,
and financing patterns  for firms of small, medium, and  and a larger share of foreign-owned  banks. The effect is
large  size,  Beck, DemirgUc-Kunt,  and Maksimovic  assess  exacerbated  by more restrictions on banks'  activities,
the effects of banking market structure on financing  more government  interference  in the banking sector, and
obstacles and the access of firms to bank finance.  The  a larger share of government-owned banks.  Finally, it is
authors find that bank concentration  increases  financing  possible  to alleviate the negative  impact of bank
obstacles  and decreases  the likelihood  of receiving bank  concentration  on access to finance  by reducing activity
finance,  with the impact decreasing  in size. The relation  restrictions.
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While the recent empirical literature provides empirical  evidence on the positive
role of the banking sector in enhancing economic growth through a more efficient
resource allocation, less emphasis has been put on the effect of the banking market
structure.'  Theory makes conflicting predictions about the relation between bank market
structure and the access to and cost of credit.  While general economic theory points to
inefficiencies  of  market power, resulting in less loans supplied at a higher interest rate,
information asymmetries and agency problems might result in a positive or nonlinear
relation between the market power of intermediaries  and the amount of loans supplied to
opaque borrowers, in a dynamic setting.  Similarly, empirical studies have derived
conflicting results, showing a positive or a negative relation between competition in
banking and the access to credit, its costs and economic growth.  Most of these studies,
however, focus on a specific country, mostly the U.S.
This paper explores the impact of bank competition on firms'  financing obstacles
and access to credit for a cross-section of 74 developed and developing countries.
Specifically, we use survey data on the financing obstacles perceived by finrns and their
financing patterns and relate these data to the competitive environment  in the country's
banking market.  We use both the market share of the largest three banks and regulatory
policies that influence the competitive  framework in which banks operate,  such as share
of bank license applications rejected and restrictions on banks' activities.  We control for
l For cross-country  studies on finance and growth, see Beck, Levine,  and Loayza (2000), Rousseau and
Wachtel (2001) and Wurgler (2000).  Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries that depend more on
external finance grow faster in economies with better developed  financial sectors.  Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimnovic (1998) show that countries with better developed banking and stock markets have a higher
share of firms that grow beyond  the rate predicted by their cash flow.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (2002) show that firms with higher financing obstacles grow more slowly, a relation that is
dampened by better developed banking systems.the ownership structure, and the institutional environment.  We assess the impact of the
market structure on firms of different  sizes, while at the same time controlling for a large
number of other firm characteristics.
Our results indicate that in more concentrated banking markets  firms of all sizes
face higher financing obstacles and are less likely to receive bank financing.  This effect
decreases as we move from small to medium and large firms, and holds when we control
for a large array of firm and country characteristics,  the institutional and regulatory
framework of the country, and the ownership structure of the banking system.
We find that the effect of bank concentration on fins depends on the country's
institutional  and regulatory framework and on who owns the banks.  The relation of bank
concentration  and financing constraints turns insignificant in countries with well
developed institutions, high levels of economic and financial development and a high
share of foreign banks.  Public bank ownership  and a high degree of govemrnment
interference in the banking system, on the other hand, exacerbate the impact of bank
concentration on financing constraints.  The interaction between bank concentration and
restrictions on banks' activities also shows that with very few activity restrictions bank
concentration may actually reduce financial obstacles and increase access to bank
finance.
Our results provide evidence for theories that focus on the negative effects of
bank market power on access to credit, especially for developing countries.  For the most
part, the results are not consistent with theories that predict a positive impact of bank
concentration on alleviating financing obstacles for small firms and allowing them access
to credit.  Our findings underline the importance of tking into account the institutional
2and regulatory framework when assessing the impact of bank concentration on firm's
financing obstacles, thus broadening the focus to the competitive and regulatory
environment in which banks operate.  They also stress the importance of regulations,
institutions, and ownership structure for policy makers who are interested in alleviating
financing obstacles.  While the concentration of the banking system cannot be changed
directly through policies and might be more related to historic determinants than policies,
policy makers can influence the ownership structure and regulatory framework of the
banking system.  For example, removing activity restrictions in a concentrated banking
system alleviates the negative impact of bank concentration  on access to finance.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature.  First, while most
empirical papers assessing the effect of bank concentration  focus on a specific country,
mostly the U.S., this paper uses cross-country analysis,  including developed, developing
and transition economies. Given the specific regulatory  and institutional development of
the U.S. a cross-country approach is important  for drawing conclusions for policy makers
in developing countries.  We construct country-level measures of bank concentration
from Bankscope  and test for the robustness using data from Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2001).
Second, to our knowledge this is the first paper using firm-level data to evaluate
the effect of market structure on access to credit and firms' financing obstacles across a
broad cross-section of both developed and developing countries and across firms of
different  sizes.2  Large parts of the theoretical  literature on bank concentration has
2While Cetorelli and Gambera  (2001) use industry-level  to assess the effect of  bank concentration on
industry growth, they are not able to differentiate between firms of different sizes. As discussed below,
Clarke, Cull and Martinez-Peria  (2001) include concentration in their firm-level analysis, but focus on the
effects of foreign bank entry.
3focused on small and young firms, so that being able to differentiate firms by size is
important in testing these theories. We use the World Business Environment  Survey
(WBES), a major cross-sectional firm level survey conducted in 80 developed and
developing countries, which includes the assessment of growth obstacles as perceived by
the firms of different sizes, financing patterns of new investment, and other firm-specific
information.  The detailed information provided about the firms and the inclusion of
small and medium-size firms makes this database unique.
Third, unlike previous studies we can exploit cross-country variance not only in
bank concentration, but also in the regulatory environment and the ownership structure of
the banking sector.  We are thus able to take a broader perspective on the competitive
environment of the banking market by including measures of the share of bank license
applications rejected, restrictions on bank's activities and the ownership structure.  We
use indicators of regulatory policies and ownership structure from Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2001).
This paper is related to three other recent papers.  Cetorelli and Gambera  (2001)
show that industries that depend more on external finance grow relatively faster in more
concentrated banking sectors, while the overall effect of bank concentration on growth is
negative.  However, they base their analysis on industry-level data rather than individual
firms.  While they can exploit the variance across industries in term of dependence on
external finance, they cannot exploit variance in the size of firms as in this paper.  Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2002) explore the effects of financing and legal
obstacles as well as corruption on firm growth, using the WBES database. They find that
firms that report higher obstacles grow more slowly.  This effect is stronger for small
4firms, but is dampened in countries with higher levels of financial and institutional
development.  Here we focus on financing obstacles,  as opposed to other obstacles to
growth and explore whether the structure of the banking market affects financing
obstacles and access to credit.  Finally, our paper is closely related to a recent paper using
similar data by Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001) that  assesses the impact of
foreign bank ownership on financing obstacles and the share of investment financed with
bank finance.  They find that a larger foreign bank presence decreases  financing obstacles
and increases the share of investment financed with bank finance,  results that are robust
to controlling for bank concentration  and regulatory  entry restrictions. Furthermore, they
also present results  that show that concentration has a negative impact on access to bank
loans.  However, because their study focuses on the impact of foreign penetration  on
access to credit they do not explore whether concentration impacts large and small firms
differently, nor whether the impact is different in countries at different levels of
institutional development.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the
motivation and theoretical underpinnings of our empirical analysis.  Section 3 presents
the data and section 4 describes the econometric methodology.  Section 5 discusses the
results and section 6 concludes.
2. Motivation
Theory makes contradictory predictions about the effect of bank concentration  on
the supply and cost of loans.  On the one side, standard economic theory predicts that
market power results in a lower supply at a higher cost, thus reducing firrn growth (we
5refer to this prediction as the structure-performance  hypothesis).  On the other side,
taking into account informational asymmetries and agency costs leads to theories that
predict a positive or nonlinear relation between market power and access to loans for
opaque borrowers in a dynamic setting. We refer to this set of theories as the information-
based  hypothesis. Further, other characteristics  of  the banking sector, such as the
ownership structure and legal and informational  environment might influence the relation
between market concentration and supply and costs of loans. This section will discuss the
different theories and the existing empirical  literature.3
Standard economic theory suggests that any deviation from perfect competition
results in less access by borrowers to loans at a higher cost (structure-performance
hypothesis). Using an endogenous growth model, Pagano (1993) interprets the absorption
of resources, resulting in a savings-investment ratio of less than one, and thus the spread
between lending and deposit rates as reflecting "the X-inefficiency of the intermediaries
and their market power." Guzman (2000) shows that a banking monopoly is more likely
to result in credit rationing than a competitive banking market and leads to a lower capital
accumulation rate.
Informational asymmetries between lender and borrower, resulting in adverse
selection, moral hazard and hold-up problems, however, may change the relation between
market structure and access to loans from a negative to a positive or nonlinear one, as
shown in several theoretical contributions.  Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that banks
with market power have more incentives to establish long-term relationships with young
borrowers,  since they can share in future surpluses.  Similarly, Marquez (2000) shows that
3  See also Cetorelli (2001) for an overview over the empirical and theoretical literature on bank
concentration.
6borrower-specific  information becomes more disperse in more competitive banking
markets, resulting in less efficient borrower screening and most likely in higher interest
rates.  Ding (2000), on the other hand, shows that the effect of competition on access to
loans depends on the source and level of competition. He shows that there is an inverted
U-shaped relation between the amount of relationship  lending and the number of banks,
with an intermediate number of  banks  able to sustain the maximum amount of
relationship  lending.  Similarly, Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) show that there are
offsetting effects of bank concentration.  While bank concentration reduces the total
amount of loanable funds, it increases the incentives  to screen borrowers and thus the
efficiency of lending. The optimal banking market structure is thus an oligopoly rather
than a monopoly or perfect competition.
However, all these models assume a high degree of enforcement of contracts and
of the capacity of banks to screen potential borrowers and do not model differences in the
legal and institutional  environments in which banks operate. These assumptions are
theoretically important and empirically relevant. The positive relation between market
power and lending to small and young borrowers might only hold if lenders are able to
recover their collateral  in case of failure and if they are able to screen the borrowers
before-hand.  Recent empirical literature has established a relation between  availability
and cost of loans and the legal and informational  environment in which lenders and
borrowers  operate.4 These findings suggest that institutions might affect the relation
between market structure and access to loans.
4Beck and Levine (2002),  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998)  show
that legal  institutions influence the availability of financing  to industries  and the creation of  new
establishments.  Claessens and Laeven (2003) show that in  countries with strong investor protection laws,
firms with less  collateral have an easier time getting extemal finance  than similar finns in countries with
7The regulatory structure of the banking system might have important implications
for the relation between market concentration and access to finance.  High regulatory
entry barriers might reduce the contestability and thus competitiveness of the banking
system, independent of the actual market structure.  Regulatory restrictions and
government interference in the intermediation process,  on the other hand, do not have a-
priori clear relation with the competitiveness of the banking system and borrowers'
access to finance.  These restrictions might decrease the competitiveness  and efficiency
in the banking system and impede banks from using their informational advantages.
Restricting banks in their activities, however, might also increase their competition in the
area they are limited to. Finally, the effect of concentration on access to finance might
depend on the regulatory restrictions bank face and vice versa.
The ownership  structure of banks might also influence the relation between
market power and access to and costs of external financing.  Domestically owned banks
might have more information  and better enforcement  mechanisms than foreign owned
banks, and so might be more willing to lend to opaque  borrowers.5 Government-owned
banks are mostly non-profit-maximizing  and often have the explicit mandate to lend to
certain groups of borrowers.6 The relation between bank concentration and access to
loans might therefore differ across different ownership structures.
Most empirical studies of the effect of bank concentration  on access to external
finance and firm growth have focused on individual countries,  and mostly the U.S.
more poorly functioning legal institutions. Pagano and Jappelli (1999) show empirically the importance of
information sharing between intermediaries for financial  development.
5 There is mixed evidence on the effects of foreign bank entry on small borrowers'  access to finance.
Compare the survey by Clarke et al. (2003) and the literature quoted therein.
6 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes  and Shleifer (2001), however, show that bank lending is more concentrated in
banking systems that are dominated by government-owned  banks.
8Hannan (1991) finds strong evidence that concentration  is associated with higher interest
rates across U.S. banking markets, thus providing  evidence  for the structure-performance
hypothesis.  Similarly, Black and Strahan (2002) find evidence across U.S. states that
higher concentration results in less new firm formation, especially in states and periods
with regulated banking markets. Petersen and Rajan (1995), on the other hand, find that
small firms are more likely to receive financing at a lower cost and are financially less
constrained in more concentrated local banking markets in the U.S.  Bergstresser (2001)
finds that in the U.S. consumers are financially  less constrained in more concentrated
banking markets.  DeYoung, Goldberg, and White (1999) find for a sample of small and
young banks across local U.S. banking markets that concentration affects small business
lending positively in urban markets and negatively in rural markets.  Jackson and Thomas
(1995) find a positive effect of bank concentration  across U.S. states on the employment
growth rate of new firms in manufacturing industries, and a negative effect on the
employment growth rate of mature firms. Using data for Italian provinces, Bonaccorsi di
Patti and Dell'Ariccia (2001)  find that bank concentration has a non-linear relation with
firm growth, increases  in concentration being associated with higher firm growth rates at
lower levels of concentration  and lower firm growth rates at higher levels of
concentration.  Further, the range of a positive relation between concentration and firm
growth is larger for industries with a higher degree of opaqueness.  Bonaccorsi di Patti
and Gobbi (2001) find that concentration has a positive effect on the credit volume to
small and medium size Italian firms, and a negative impact on large firms.
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001)  use industry-level data for 41 countries to explore
the effect of bank concentration on growth.  They show that while bank concentration
9imposes a deadweight loss on the overall economy by depressing the average industry
growth rate, it fosters the growth of industries whose younger firms depend heavily on
external  finance.  However,  this positive effect is off-set in banking systems that are
heavily dominated by government-owned banks.  Further, Cetorelli and Gambera show
that the positive effect of bank concentration  on industries that are heavily dependent on
external finance works through an increase in the number of firms rather than an increase
in the average size thus rejecting the hypothesis that bank concentration  leads to
industrial concentration.  Using a similar model, Cetorelli (2001), however,  shows that
financially dependent industries are more concentrated in countries with more
concentrated banking systems.
Overall, both theoretical and empirical contributions yield contradictory
conclusions. The structure-performance  hypothesis predicts a negative relation between
bank concentration and access to credit, while the information-based  hypothesis predicts
a positive or non-linear relation. Further, the relation might vary for firms of different
sizes and across different institutional  environments and ownership structures of the
banking system. Using a panel data set of both developed and developing countries and
of firms of different  sizes, we will therefore  test:
o  Is bank concentration positively or negatively related to financing obstacles and
the access to credit?
o  Does the relation between concentration and financing obstacles and the access to
credit vary across firms of different sizes?
10*  Does the relation between concentration  and financing obstacles and the access to
credit vary across different  regulatory regimes, ownership structures and
institutional  environments?
3. Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the different data sources and the variables we will be
using in the empirical  analysis.  Our empirical analysis uses data from three main
sources: the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) for firm-level data,
Bankscope for our main concentration indicator, and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) for
country-level  data on bank ownership  structure and regulatory measures. Table 1 presents
the country-level variables for the 74 developed and developing countries in our sample.
Descriptive statistics and correlations  are in Table 2.
The WBES firm-level data consist of firm survey responses of over  10,000 firms
in 80 countries, both developed and developing.  We have information on firm size,
government ownership, foreign ownership, and whether the firm is an exporter.  The
survey has a large number of questions on the business environment in which firms
operate including assessment of growth obstacles firms face.  The database also includes
information on firm sales, industry, growth, financing patterns, and number of
competitors.
We use survey responses on to what extent entrepreneurs perceive finance as an
obstacle to growth. To explore the link between bank market structure and the financing
obstacles we use the survey question: "How problematic is financing for the operation
and growth of your business?" Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle),  2 (minor
11obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Table 1 shows that perceived
financing obstacles do not only vary across firms within a country, but also significantly
across countries. Portuguese firms rate financing obstacles as less than minor (1.73),
while firms in Haiti rate financing obstacles as more than moderate (3.48). Overall, 38%
of all firms in the sample report financing as major obstacle, 27% as moderate obstacle,
17% as minor and  18% as no obstacle.
Apart from this General Financing Obstacle, we also use indicators of more
specific financing obstacles,  such as high interest rates, the need for special connections,
access to long-term loans, the lack of financial/credit  informnation, collateral
requirements,  bank bureaucracy and corruption of bank officials.  Answers also vary
between one and four and the assessments of specific financing obstacles are highly
correlated with the General Financing Obstacle (Table 2 Panel B).
We also explore the relation between banking market structure and the actual
access to bank finance by firms.  WBES has information on financing patterns, i.e. the
share of investment that is financed internally, by equity, by trade credit, by bank finance
etc.  Using these data we construct a dummy variable Bank Finance that takes the value
one if firms obtain bank financing from banks and zero if they do not.  39% of all firns in
our sample receive bank finance.  This share, however,  varies significantly across
countries, from 6% in Armenia to 88% in Trinidad and Tobago.
We control  for several firm attributes such as ownership.  Government  takes on
the value one if the firm is owned by the government, and Foreign takes on the value one
if the firm is foreign owned. Our sample includes  12% government owned firms and 19%
foreign firns. We include dummy variables for exporting firms, the manufacturing and
12service sector, as well as the log of the number of competitors.  37% of the firms in our
sample are in manufacturing  and 45%  in service, and on average they face 2.3
competitors.  Finally, we include the log of sales in USD as indicator of size, which
ranges from -2.12 to 25.3, with an average of 9.9.
The correlation analysis in Table 2 Panel B indicates that government-owned
firms, domestically owned firms, non-exporting firms, smaller firms (as measured by
sales), and firms with more competitors  face higher financing obstacles. Privately owned,
foreign, exporting, and larger firms, as well as firms with few competitors are more likely
to receive bank financing.  Interestingly, the correlation between the General Financing
Obstacle and Bank Finance is insignificant, although Bank Finance  is significantly
correlated with some of the individual  financing obstacles.
We use bank-level data from the BankScope database to calculate the
concentration  ratio.  The BankScope database covers at least 90% of the banking sector
in most countries.  We use data on commercial, savings, and cooperative banks as well as
non-bank credit institutions to calculate Bank Concentration  as the share of the assets of
the largest three banks in total banking sector assets. We use the average for the
concentration measures for 1995-99.  This concentration measure has a wide variation,
from 18% for the U.S.  to 100% for Belize, as Figure I shows.
Firms of all sizes report higher financing obstacles and face a lower probability of
access to bank finance in more concentrated banking systems,  as shown by the
correlations in Table [I and illustrated by Figures II and III. For these two figures we split
countries  into two groups, with concentration ratios below and above the median of 61%.
As can be seen, firms of  all sizes report higher financing obstacles in countries above  the
13median concentration ratio and face a lower probability of receiving bank finance.
Surprisingly, not all individual financing obstacles are positively correlated with bank
concentration (Table II Panel B).  Firms in more concentrated banking systems face less
obstacles due to the need for special connections, collateral requirements and bank
bureaucracy.
To test the robustness of our results, we use the deposit share of the five largest
banks in total banking system deposits,  from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001). Unlike
the BankScope measure, this indicator is based on deposits, and on a survey of Central
Banks and regulatory and supervisory authorities.  While the survey measure does not
suffer from problems of coverage as the BankScope measure, it might be subject to
measurement  error, due to different definitions across countries.  This survey was
undertaken  in 1999, so that this alternative  concentration measure is approximately  for
the same time period as our principal measure.  The correlation  coefficient between the
two concentration measures is 0.76, significant at the 1%-level.
Bank concentration, as measured by the market share of the largest banks,
captures only one dimension of the competitiveness of the banking system.  Restrictions
on banks' activities and the contestability of the banking market constitute other
dimensions.  We therefore control for these aspects, as well as interact them with our
concentration  measure.  Specifically,  we use Restrict, which is an index of the degree to
which bank' activities are restricted in the underwriting of securities, insurance, real
estate, and in owning shares in non-financial  firms.  This indicator ranges from 4 to  16,
with higher values indicating more restrictions on banks' activities.  We use Fraction
Denied, the fraction of  applications  for bank licenses rejected as indicator of the
14contestability of the banking market.7 Both regulatory indicators are from Barth, Caprio,
and Levine (2001).  We use an indicator of the amount of information that is available to
lenders from credit registries in the country.  Credit  Bureau is the average of four
variables that indicate (i) whether the credit registry offers only negative or also positive
information about borrowers,  (ii) the amount of information available  about borrowers,
(iii) which institutions have access to the data, and (iv) whether information is available
for each loan or only aggregated for each borrower.  The indicator is normalized between
zero and one, with higher values indicating more information being available to more
institutions.  Data are from Galindo and Miller (2001)  and available for 30 countries.8
Finally, we use a general indicator of Banking Freedom from Heritage Foundation, which
indicates the absence of government  interference in the banking system and is averaged
over the period 1995-99.9
We use indicators of the institutional  environment of a country to (i) control for
institutional development when assessing the effect of concentration,  and (ii) assess
whether the effect of concentration varies across countries with different levels of
institutional development.  Specifically,  we use Rule of  Law, an indicator of the degree to
which inhabitants of a country can trust the legal system of their country to up-hold their
rights.  This indicator is from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and reflects the
assessment of foreign investors.  It ranges from one to six, with higher numbers
7 In the case where there were no applications  (and therefore no rejections), this indicator takes the value
one.
8  Galindo and Miller (2001)  also take into account which  types of loans are reported in  the registry.
However, including this variable would have reduced our coverage by another six countries.  However,
results are similar when using this more comprehensive indicator.
9  Specifically,  this indicator is based on five questions:  1.  Does the government own banks? 2. Can foreign
banks open branches and subsidiaries? 3. Does the government influence credit allocation? 4. Are banks
free to operate without government  regulations such  as deposit insurance? 5. Are banks free to offer all
types of financial services like buying and selling real estate, securities and insurance policies?
15indicating a better legal environment.  Corruption  (ICRG) is an indicator of corruption
and ranges from one to six, with higher numbers indicating less corruption. Institutional
Development is a summary variable from Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2001)
that averages  six indicators proxying for voice and accountability,  regulatory quality,
political stability, rule of law, control of corruption and effectiveness of government.
Finally, we use the log of real GDP per capita.  Recent research has established a robust
relation between well-developed institutions and income per capita, so that GDP per
capita can be seen as an overall proxy for institutional development.'°
As discussed above, the ownership structure of the banking sector might affect
both the market structure and the functioning of the banking sector, thus affecting firmns'
financing obstacles and access to credit. We therefore include the share of banking
system's assets in banks that are 50% or more government  owned (Public  Bank Share) or
50% or more foreign owned (Foreign  Bank Share). Both measures are from Barth,
Caprio and Levine (2001).  Finally, we include a measure of financial intermediary
development, Private  Credit, which is the share of claims by financial institutions on the
private sector in GDP.
To assess the robustness of the relation between market structure and firms'
access to external financing and growth, we include other country-level variables.  We
include the growth rate of GDP per capita since firms in faster growing countries  are
expected to grow faster and face lower obstacles.  We use the inflation rate to proxy for
monetary instability, conjecturing that firms in more stable monetary environments  face
fewer obstacles.
'° Acemoglu,  Johnson and Robinson (2001)  show a relation between  institutional development and
economic development that is  robust to reverse causation and simultaneity bias.
16Many of the country-level variables are highly correlated with each other, as
shown in Panel C of Table 2.  More concentrated banking systems have lower levels of
financial, economic and institutional development,  have more foreign banks, share less
information, and face more restrictions and more government interference.  Many of the
explanatory country-level  variables are also highly correlated with each other, which
underlines the importance of controlling  for these country characteristics when assessing
the impact of bank concentration.
4.  The Empirical Model
To explore the effect of bank concentration  on firms' financing obstacles access
to credit, we estimate two different empirical models.  To estimate the effect of bank
concentration on financing obstacles, we use the following regression:
Financing Obstaclej,k = a  + ,B Governmentj,k  + ,2 Foreignj,k +  13 Exporterj,k + P4 No. of
Competitorsj,k + P5  Manufacturingj,k  +  P6 Servicesj,k  + P7 SiZejk + P8lnflationk +  9
Growthk + PIo  Concentrationk +£j,k.  (1)
Given that Financing Obstacle is a polychotomous dependent variable with a natural
order, we use the ordered probit model to estimate regression (1). We assume that the
disturbance parameter E  has a normal distribution and use standard maximum likelihood
estimation.  The coefficient of interest is 1lo; a positive coefficient would be evidence  in
favor of the structure-performance  hypothesis, while a negative or insignificant
coefficient evidence  for theories of the information-based  hypothesis.  The coefficients,
17however, cannot be interpreted as marginal effects of a one-unit increase  in the
independent variable on the dependent variable, given the non-linear structure of the
model.  Rather, the marginal effect is calculated as 4(3'x)p, where 4 is the standard
normal density at ,B'x.
To assess whether bank concentration has a different effect on firms depending on
their size, we interact concentration with dummy variables indicating whether the firm is
small (5-50 emnployees),  medium-size (51-500 employees)  or large (more than 500
employees).  In altemative specifications, we also control for measures of institutional
environment, ownership structure of the banking system and regulatory variables, as well
as their interaction with bank concentration.  Finally, we replace the dependent variable
by individual financing obstacles, as described in the previous section.
We also assess the effect of bank concentration on the actual access of firms to
bank finance with the following baseline regression:
Bank Financej,k = a + PI Governmnentj,k + 02 Foreigni,k + P3 Exporterj,k +43  No. of
Competitorsj,k  + P5  Manufacturing9,k +  f36 Servicesjk  + P7 Sizej,k + I38Inflationk  + f9
Growthk + P1o  Concentrationk + qj,k.  (2)
Since Bank Finance is a dummy variable, we use probit regressions to estimate
(2).  A negative coefficient on PI 0 would be evidence in favor of the structure-
performance  hypothesis, while a positive or insignificant coefficient evidence  for theories
of the information-based  hypothesis.  As before we introduce interactions  with size
18dummies,  control for the institutional and regulatory environment and ownership
structure of the banking system and interact Concentration with these variables.
5. Results
Firms face higher financing  obstacles and are less likely to access bank financing
in more concentrated banking systems.  In column 1 of Table  HI,  Bank Concentration
enters significantly positive, indicating that firms in countries with more concentrated
banking systems report higher financing  obstacles.  Bank Concentration  enters
significantly and negatively in column  4 indicating that firms in more concentrated
banking systems are less likely to receive bank finance.  When we interact Bank
Concentration with dummy variables for small, medium, and large firms, the interactions
for small and medium firms enter significantly  at the 5% level in the regression of
General Financing  Obstacle, while only the interaction with the Small Firm dummy
enters significantly at the 5% level in the Bank Finance regression (columns 2 and 5).
Further, the interaction with Small is largest in both regressions,  indicating that the
growth-impeding effect of bank concentration  is largest for small firms. "  l Finally, we use
our altemative  concentration  measure from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)  and confirm
our results of a positive relation of bank concentration with the General Financing
Obstacle and a negative relation with the probability of firms receiving bank finance
(columns 3 and 6).12
The Table III results also indicate that foreign owned firms and services firms and
larger firms face less financing obstacles.  Exporting and large firms are more likely to
" We also find that the interactions with the Small and Medium dunmnies in column 3 are significantly
different from the Large dummy.
19receive bank financing.  Firms in faster growing economies with lower inflation face less
financing obstacles and are more likely to receive bank financing.
The Table III results are not only statistically significant, but also of economic
significance, as illustrated in Table IV. Here we present the probability that enterprises
rank financing as major obstacle to growth and operation (Financing Obstacle=4) and the
probability that enterprises finance their investment with bank finance, at different levels
of  Concentration.  Holding constant all other factors that determine firms' financing
obstacles, moving from the 25% percentile of Concentration (Peru) to the 75% percentile
(Senegal) increases the probability that financing is reported as major obstacle by 14%,
while reducing the probability of access to bank finance by 15%, compared to the sample
means of 38% and 39%, respectively.  This effect is much stronger for small enterprises
(16% and 23%, respectively)  than for large enterprises (5%  and 2%, respectively).
Overall, these results are supportive of the structure-performance  hypothesis, but
inconsistent with the information-based hypothesis.
The market share of the largest three banks, however, is only one dimension of
the competitiveness of a banking sector.  Contestability, absence of government
interference, information sharing and restrictions on banks'  activities constitute other
important elements of this competitive environment in which banks operate.  In Table V,
we therefore introduce measures  of the regulatory environment.  Firms in countries where
banks are more restricted in their entry and in their activities outside the traditional credit
and deposit market report higher financing obstacles.  Firms in countries with higher
levels of government interference  in the banking system report higher financing obstacles
and have a lower probability of receiving bank finance.  While the coefficient estimates
12 We also tried regressions with a quadratic  term of concentration, but it never entered significantly.
20suggest that having firms in countries with better developed credit registries report higher
financing obstacles and facer a lower probability of accessing bank finance, these results
are not significant at the 5%  level. Bank Concentration enters significantly in all
regressions of the General Financing Obstacle, when we control  for restrictions on banks'
activities, the fraction of bank license applications denied, banking freedom and credit
registry. Bank Concentration does not enter significantly,  however, in  the regressions of
Bank Finance, when we control for regulatory policies, except for the regression
controlling for Credit Registry. In the case of Restrict and Fraction Denied, this is due to
the smaller sample that we utilize when including these variables.
More restrictions on banks' activities, more government interference in the
banking system and less information sharing through credit registries exacerbate  the
negative association of bank concentration with financing obstacles, as shown in Table
VI.  Here we interact Bank Concentration  with the different regulatory measures.  This
suggests that policies that restrict banks' possibilities of diversifying outside the credit
and deposit business, increase government interference  and restrict information sharing
increase the impact that bank concentration has on financing obstacles.  However, the
coefficient estimates also indicate that firms in more concentrated  banking systems face
lower financing obstacles if there are few regulatory restrictions on banks' activities. The
positive effect of bank concentration and Restrict is not very widespread, however,  since
banks in concentrated banking systems  face more restrictions on their activities, as shown
by the positive correlation  in Table II C.  Indeed, for most of the sample bank
concentration either has an insignificant or adverse effect on financing obstacles and bank
21finance.'3 Similarly, higher levels of concentration exacerbates the negative effects of
activity restrictions.  Furthermore, better information sharing increases the likelihood of
receiving credit, but decreases  it in concentrated banking systems, while Banking
Freedom reduces the negative effect of concentration on the probability of receiving bank
finance.  There does not seem to be any interaction between bank concentration  and the
share of bank license applications  denied.
The empirical relation between Bank Concentration and firms'  financing
obstacles and access to credit is robust to controlling for the institutional environment,  as
shown in Table VII. Controlling for Rule of Law, Corruption, Institutional Development,
and GDP per capita we still find a significant association of Bank Concentration and
Bank Finance.  The relation between Bank Concentration and firms' financing obstacles
is weakened when we control for GDP per capita, but robust to the inclusion of Rule of
Law, Corruption and Institutional Development.  Higher levels of Rule of Law,
Corruption, Institutional Development and GDP per capita alleviate financing obstacles,
while higher levels of Institutional  Development and GDP per capita increase the
likelihood that firms receive bank financing.
The estimates in Table VIII suggest that the positive association of bank
concentration with firms' financing obstacles and the negative relation  with access to
credit holds only for countries with low levels of institutional development.  Here, we
interact Bank Concentration with indicators of the institutional environment.  The
interaction terms with Rule of Law, Corruption, Institutional Development and GDP per
capita enter significantly and negatively in the regression of the General Financing
13 At restrict values higher than 8 (7 if  we also control for institutions) the impact of concentration on
financing obstacles is insignificant or positive.
22Obstacle (columns  1-4), indicating that bank concentration has less of an effect in
countries with high levels of institutional development.  Considering the coefficient size
suggests that there is no effect of bank concentration on financing obstacles in the
countries with the highest levels of institutional development.  The interactions of Bank
Concentration and Corruption, Institutional Development and GDP per capita enter
significantly positive in the Bank Finance regressions, indicating that the negative effect
of bank concentration  on the likelihood of receiving bank financing, is reduced or even
eliminated in countries with high levels of institutional development.' 4
The results in Table IX suggest that the relation between concentration and
financing obstacles is robust to controlling for the level of financial intermediary
development and the ownership  structure of the banking system.  Bank Concentration
does not enter significantly in the Bank Finance, when we control for the share of foreign
owned and state-owned banks (columns 4 -6 ), a result that is due to the smaller sample.
While a higher level of financial intermediary development and a larger presence of
foreign banks alleviate financing obstacles,  a larger share of government-owned  banks
increases  financing obstacles.'5 A larger presence of foreign banks increases the
likelihood of receiving Bank Finance, while a larger presence of state-owned banks
decreases it. There does not seem to be a robust relation between the level of financial
development and access to finance.
The presence of foreign banks alleviates the association of concentration with
financing obstacles, while public bank ownership exacerbates  it, as shown by the results
14  Surprisingly, Corruption enters significantly  and negatively in the Bank Finance regressions.
Considering  the coefficient estimates this indicates that in countries with concentration  ratios below 0.56,
absence of corruption decreases the likelihood of receiving bank finance.
23in Table X. Here we not only control for financial development and ownership structure,
but also interact these variables with Bank Concentration.  The interaction  of Bank
Concentration with Foreign Bank Share enters significantly and negatively, suggesting
that foreign bank ownership alleviates  the negative impact of bank concentration  on
financing obstacles.  The interaction of Bank Concentration with Public Bank Share
enters significantly and positively, while Bank Concentration does not enter significantly
and the share of government-owned banks enters positively and significantly. This seems
to indicate that government-owned banks can actually help alleviate financing obstacles
in countries with low concentration ratios and that bank concentration  affects financing
obstacles only in banking systems with government-owned  banks.  There does not seem
to be an interaction of bank concentration and Private Credit in their effects on financing
obstacles.  More bank concentration  in countries with high levels of financial
intermediary development,  on the other hand,  seem to decrease firns' probability of
receiving bank finance. A higher level of financial development,  on the other hand,
dampens the negative effect that Bank Concentration has on the probability of receiving
bank financing.  There is no effect of the ownership structure on the relation between
Bank Finance  and Bank Concentration.
The effect of bank concentration is not equal across the different dimensions of
the financing  obstacles finns face. Panel A of Table XI presents the results for a number
of specific financing obstacles that firms were asked about in the WBES  survey. We find
that firms in more concentrated banking systems report higher financing  obstacles due to
high interest rates, access to long-term loans, credit information,  and bank corruption.  In
5 The result for foreign bank market share is consistent with the results found by Cull, Clarke  and Martinez
Peria (2002).
24more concentrated banking systems, however, firms report lower financing constraints
due to bank bureaucracy.  Panel B presents regressions where we interact Concentration
with Institutional Development.  These results indicate that firms report less financing
constraints due to high interest rates in more concentrated banking systems, unless being
in institutionally  well developed economies, where there is no effect. Further, firms
report lower financing constraints due to special connections,  collateral and bank
bureaucracy,  an effect that is strengthened by institutional development in the cases of
special connections and bank bureaucracy.  Firms still report higher financing constraints
due to credit information, unless being in a institutionally developed country. We
interpret these seemingly contradicting  results as indicating  that bank concentration  is a
multi-faceted  phenomenon  with both positive and negative effects on firms'  financing
choices.  Further, taking Panel A and Panel B results together underlines the importance
of controlling  for the level of institutional  development, when evaluating the effect of
bank concentration.
6. Conclusions
This paper assessed the importance of the competitiveness of the banking system
for financing obstacles firms face and the likelihood of receiving bank finance.  A
recently compiled firm database allows us to distinguish between the effect of the market
structure on small, medium-size and large firms.  Further, a broad cross-country survey
on bank regulation allows us to focus on the overall competitive environment in the
banking market beyond simple concentration ratios.
25We find that bank concentration increases financing obstacles and decreases the
probability of receiving bank finance.  The effect is stronger for small and medium
compared to large firms. The effect of bank concentration on financing obstacles is
dampened in countries with more efficient legal systems,  less corruption, higher levels of
financial, economic and institutional development, and a larger presence of foreign
banks.  The effect of bank concentration  is exacerbated, on the other hand, in countries
with more restrictions  on banks'  activities, high government interference  in the banking
system and a higher share of government-owned  banks.  Further, firms in countries with
more government interference in the banking system, a lower share of foreign and a
higher share of government-owned banks face higher financing obstacles.  In addition the
results indicate  that in concentrated banking systems it is possible to reverse the adverse
affects of concentration  on access to finance by removing restrictions on bank activities.
Our results shed light on the theoretical debate on the effects of banks' market
power on firms'  access to credit.  Our findings provide qualified evidence  for theories
that focus on the negative effects of bank power (structure-performance  hypothesis),
while they are inconsistent with theories that stress the potential positive effects of bank
concentration (information-based  hypothesis).  However, our results also underline the
importance of controlling for the institutional  and regulatory environment when assessing
the effect of market competitiveness.  While we find a strong relation between bank
concentration and higher financing constraints and a lower probability of bank finance  in
institutionally less developed economies (consistent with the performance-structure
hypothesis), this relation is insignificant for institutionally,  financially  and economically
well developed economies.
26Our findings send important messages for policy makers, especially in developing
countries.  While they cannot influence concentration  ratios - often determined by
historical factors - they can impact the ownership structure of the banking system, its
regulatory  framework and the overall institutional environment.
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33Table 11
Economic  Imndicators and Obstacles to Firm Glrowth
General  Financing Obstacle  is the response  to the question "How problemattc  is financing for the operation and growth of your business?" Answers  vary between  I (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle),  3  (moderate obstacle), and 4
(major obstacle).  Bank Finance is a dummy vanable that takes on the value one if the firm receives bank finance, and zero otherwise.  Concentration  is the share of the largest three banks in total banking assets.  GDP per capita is
real GDP per capita in US$  Pnvate Credit is claims on the private  sector by financial  institutions as share of GDP.  Rule of Law is the extent to which a country's cittzen tust its legal system. Coruption indicates  the absence of
corruption.  Institutional Development  is an average of six indicators  measuring voice and accountability,  control of conuption, regulatory quality, political stability, rule of law, and government efficiency..  Foreign Bank Share  is
the share of assets in banks that are majority foreign owned  Public Bank Share is the share of assets in banks that are majonty state-owned.  Restnct is an indicator of the degree to which banks' activities are restricted  outside the
credit and deposit business. Fraction denied is the share of bank license  applications rejected.  Credit registry is an aggregate mdhcator of the infonnation available through credit registries.  Banking Freedom  isa general indicator
of the absence of  government  interference in the banking sector.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given m the appendix.
General
Financing  Bank  GDP per  Private  Institutional  Foreign bank  Public Bank  Fraction  Credit  Banking
Obstacle  Finance  Concentration  capita  Credit  Rule of Law  Corruption  Development  Share  Share  Restnct  denied  registry  Freedom
Argentina  3.03  0.69  0.34  8,001  0.21  5.00  2.00  0.33  49.00  30.00  7  0.00  0.60  3.80
Armenia  2.65  0.06  0.88  844  0.04  -0.43  3.00
Azerbaijan  2.86  0.07  0.96  408  -0.78  2.00
Belarus  3.28  0.20  0.81  2,235  0.06  4 00  4.00  -0.76  2.80  67.30  13  0.00  0 69  3.00
Belize  2.69  0.60  1.00  2,738  0.41  3.00
Bolivia  3.04  0.62  0.46  939  0.51  3.00  3.00  0.02  42.30  0.00  12  1.00  0.59  3.60
Botswana  2.34  0.90  3,546  0.11  4.00  3.00  0.56  97 61  2.39  10  0.00  3.80
Brazil  2.71  0.51  0.40  4,489  0.32  2.05  3.00  0.00  16.70  51.50  10  0.74  0.83  3.00
Bulgaria  3.13  0.22  066  1,418  014  4.00  4.00  001  3.00
Cameroon  3.07  0.91  631  0.14  3 00  2.00  -0.72  2.20
Canada  2.07  0.63  0.54  20,549  0.83  6.00  6 00  - 1.43  0.00  7  000  4.00
Chile  2.43  0.76  0.46  4,992  0.68  5.00  4.00  0.88  32.00  11.70  11  1 00  0.65  3.00
China  3.34  0.31  0.80  677  0.85  5.00  2 00  -0.20  14  0.25  3  00
Colombia  2.68  0.64  0.32  2,381  0.36  2.00  1.55  -0.41  0.53  4.00
Costa Rica  2.51  0.50  0.66  3,641  0.15  4.00  5.00  0.81  0.80  3.00
Cote d'lvoire  2.81  0.90  763  0.26  3 00  2 00  -0  19  3.00
Croatia  3.34  0.46  0.58  3,846  0.00  5.00  2 00  0.03  6.67  36.99  7  0 56  3.00
Czech Republic  3.13  0.21  0.61  5,163  0.58  5.14  4.00  0.68  26.00  19.00  8  0.36  5.00
DominicanRepublic  2.58  0.64  061  1,712  0.24  4.00  4.00  -0.11  0.49  3.00
Ecuador  3.34  0.40  0.67  1,538  0.30  3.36  3.00  -0.32  0.49  3.00
Egypt  3.00  0.57  1,108  0.33  4.00  2.00  -0.15  4.20  66.60  13  1.00  3.40
El Salvador  2.87  0.60  0.68  t,706  0.36  3.00  4.00  -0 03  12 50  7.00  13  0.00  4.00
Estonia  2 49  0.55  0.85  3,664  0.16  4.00  5.00  0.61  85.00  0.00  8  0.00  0 65  4.00
Ethiopia  2.97  0.97  109  0.21  5.00  200  -0.12  200
France  2.76  0.47  0.27  27,720  0.84  5.00  3.86  1.03  6  0.00  3.00
Georgia  3.23  0.26  0.81  411  -0.61  2.00
Gennany  2.54  0.58  0.32  30,794  1.06  6 00  5.00  1.37  4.20  42.00  5.00  0 00  0.45  3.60
34General Financing  Bank  GDP per  Private  Institutional  Foreign bank  Public Bank  Fraction  Credit  Banking
Obstacle  Finance  Concentration  capita  Credit  Rule of Law  Corruption  Development  Share  Share  Restrict  denied  registy  Freedom
Ghana  3.07  0.75  393  0.05  3.00  3.00  -0.14  54.30  37.90  12.00  0.80  3 00
Guatemala  2.97  0.63  0.26  1,503  018  2.14  4.00  -0 51  4.93  7.61  13.00  0.30  0.56  3.60
Haiti  3.48  0.41  0.97  369  0.12  2.59  2.23  -1.14  044  160
Honduras  2.85  0.56  0.41  708  0.26  2.05  2 00  -0.43  1.60  1.10  9.00  0.20  3.00
Hungary  2.67  0.31  0.51  4,706  0.22  6 00  5.00  0.87  62.00  2.50  9  0.50  3.80
India  2.54  0.35  414  0.21  4.00  3.00  0.00  0.00  80.00  10  0.55  2.00
Indonesia  2.86  0.29  0.39  1,045  0 52  2.64  1.32  -0.77  7.00  44.00  14  1.00  280
Italy  2.11  078  0.27  19,646  057  6.00  355  0.91  500  1700  1O  0.27  0.51  3.60
Kazakhstan  3.17  0.14  0.81  1,313  4.00  3.00  -0.53  2.00
Kenya  2.84  0.54  339  0.34  2.45  2.05  -0.78  10  0.85  3.60
Lithuama  2.88  0.25  0.86  1,907  0.11  4 00  3.00  0.26  48 00  44.00  9  0.67  2.75
Madagascar  3.13  095  238  0.13  3.00  4.00  . -0.38  2.00
Malawi  2.74  0.94  154  0 11  4.00  3.00  -0.17  8.30  48 90  13  0.00  3.00
Malaysia  2.65  0.54  0.36  4,536  1.30  4.59  3.59  0.51  1800  000  10  1.00  0.07  3.00
Mexico  3.40  0.22  063  3,393  0.22  241  2.73  -007  19.90  25.00  12  0.51  200
Moldova  3 44  0.24  0.76  666  0.06  5 00  2 00  -0 20  33.37  7 05  7  0.60  2 60
Namibia  1.91  0.79  2,325  0.38  6.00  4 00  0 47  11  0.67  4 00
Nicaragua  3.17  0.43  0.41  447  0.31  4.00  4.00  -0 41  280
Nigena  3.14  0.50  254  0.08  3.00  1.45  -1.00  0 00  13.00  0.00  2.20
Pakistan  3.28  0.50  0.63  503  0.23  3.14  3.00  -0.59  3.40
Panama  2.18  078  0.22  3,124  078  3.00  200  0.11  38.33  1156  8  0.00  049  5.00
Peru  3.04  0 60  0.46  2,335  0.18  3.00  3 00  -0.18  40.40  2.50  8  0.00  0.63  4.00
Philippines  2.68  0.44  0 36  1,125  0.50  4.00  3.50  0.21  12.79  12.12  7  0 00  3 00
Poland  2.41  0.33  0.51  3,216  0.12  5.00  4.82  0.70  2640  43.70  10  0.00  3.00
Portugal  1 73  0 29  0.43  11,582  0.73  5.00  5.00  1.20  1170  20.80  9  0.00  0.40  3.00
Romania  3.30  0.27  0.83  1,365  0.09  4.77  3.00  -0.08  8.00  70.00  13  0 38  3.00
Russia  3.22  0.20  0.38  2,214  0.08  3.45  1.91  -0 54  9.00  68.00  8  038  3 60
Senegal  3 00  0 78  563  0.21  3.00  3.00  -0 30  015  3.00
Singapore  1.85  0.59  0.60  25,374  1.11  6.00  4.00  1.44  50.00  0.00  8  1.00  400
Slovakia  3.31  0.24  0 65  3,805  0.30  5 00  3  36  0 28  3.00
Slovenia  2.29  0.46  0 60  10,226  0.26  5.00  4 00  0.85  4.60  39.60  9  1.00  4.00
35General  Public
Financing  GDP per  Institutional  Foreign bank  Bank  Fraction  Credit  Banking
Obstacle  Bank Finance  Concentration  capita Pnvate Credit  Rule of Law  Corruption  Development  Share  Share  Restrict  denied  registy  Freedom
South Afnca  2.45  0.67  3,920  1.18  2.59  3.73  0.11  5.20  0.00  8  0.33  3.00
Spain  224  0.55  0.47  15,858  0.79  4.00  5.00  1.10  11.00  0.00  7  0.00  0.16  3.60
Sweden  1.89  0.53  0.72  28,258  0.82  6.00  6.00  1.53  1.80  0.00  9  0.08  0.61  3.60
Tanzania  3.00  0.77  182  0.09  5.00  3.00  -0.13  3.00
Thailand  3.11  0.56  2,835  1.46  5.00  2.14  0.15  7.16  30.67  9  100  043  3.00
Trinidad&Tobago  3.03  0.88  0.70  4,526  0.40  4.00  3.00  0.59  7.90  15.00  9  0.50  400
Tunisia  1.69  0.48  2,200  0.60  5.00  3.00  0.30  3.60
Turkey  3.13  0.50  0.54  3,007  0.16  3.91  2.00  -0  33  6.00  35.00  12  0.29  4.00
Uganda  3.13  0.56  324  0.04  4.00  2.00  -0.34  3.00
Ukraine  3.45  0.18  0.57  867  0.01  -0.58  0.48  2.20
United Kingdom  2.25  0.32  0.40  20,187  1.16  6.00  5.00  1.50  0.00  5  5.00
United States  2.33  0.69  0.18  29,253  1.84  6.00  4.00  1.30  4.70  0.00  12  0.00  0.83  4.00
Uruguay  2.72  0.77  0.72  6,114  0.27  3.00  3.00  0.57  0.51  3.80
Venezuela  2.49  0.41  0.53  3,471  0.10  4.00  3.00  -0.37  33.72  4.87  10  0.00  0.49  3.20
Zambia  2.71  0.76  394  0.06  4.00  3.00  -0.20  64.00  23.00  13  0.00  4.00
Zimbabwe  3.03  0.62  693  0.29  4.00  2.00  -0.53  3.00
36Table I
Summary Statistics and Correlations
Summary statistics are presented in Panel A and correlations in Panels B and C, respectively.  General Financing Obstacle  is the
response to the question "How problematic is financing for the operation  and growth of your business?" Answers vary between I (no
obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). High  interest rates, special connection,  long-term loans,
credit information, collateral requirements, bank bureaucracy,  and bank official corruption are constructed  m a smilar way. Bank
Finance is a durmy variable that takes on the value one if the firm receives bank finance, and zero otherwise  Government and
Foreign are dummy variables that take the value  I if the firm has govemment or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a
dummy vanable that mdicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Manufacturing  and Services are industry dummes.  Sales is the
loganthm of sales in USS. Number of Competitors  is the  logarithm of  the number of  competitors  tbe firm has. Concentration  is the
share of the largest three banks in total banking sector assets. Restrict is an indicator of the degree  to which banks' activities are
restricted outside the credit and deposit business.  Fraction denied  is the share of bank license applications rejected.  Banking Freedom
is a general indicator of the absence of govemment interference  in the banking sector.  Credit registry indicator is a summary  variable
of the amount of infornation and the number of institutions that have access to borrower information from credit registries in a
country. Rule of  Law is the degree to which citizens trust its country's legal system  Corruption indicates the degree to which there is
no corruption in a country.  Institutional Development is an average of six indicators measuring voice and accountability,  control of
corruption, regulatory  quality, political stability, rule of law, and government efficiency.  Pnvate Credit  is claims on the private sector
by financial  institutions as share of GDP. Foreign Bank Share is the share of assets in banks that are majority foreign owned. Public
Bank Share is the share of assets in banks that are majonty state-owned.  Growth  is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log
difference of the consumer price index.  GDP per capita is real GDP per capita in USS. Detailed definitions and the sources are  in the
data appendix.
Panel A: Summary Statistics:
Variable  Obs  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Max  Mm
Generalfinancingobstacle  6,716  2.84  3  1.12  4.00  1.00
High interest rates  6,822  3.23  4  1.03  4.00  1.00
Special connection  6,461  2  19  2  1 08  4.00  1.00
Long-tern  loans  5,382  2.62  3  1.26  4.00  1.00
Credit information  5,955  2.23  2  1.12  4.00  1.00
Collateral  6,492  2 49  3  1.16  4.00  1 00
Bank bureaucracy  6,629  2.50  3  1.08  4.00  1.00
Bank official corruption  5,761  1.72  1  1.03  4.00  1.00
Bank finance  4,693  0 39  0  0.49  1.00  0.00
Government  7,186  0.12  0  0.33  1.00  0.00
Foreign  7,186  0.19  0  0.39  1.00  0.00
Exporter  7,186  0.37  0  0.48  1.00  0.00
Manufacturing  7,186  0.37  0  0.48  1.00  0.00
Services  7,186  0.45  0  0.50  1.00  0.00
Sales  7,186  9.94  12  6292  8.15  25 33  -2.12
NumberofCompetitors  7.186  0.83  0.6931472  0.33  2.20  0.00
Concentration  74  0.61  0 61  0.21  1.00  0 18
Restrict  48  9.73  9 50  2.39  14.00  5.00
Fraction denied  44  0.36  0.26  040  1 00  0.00
Banking Freedom  74  3.21  3.00  0.72  5.00  1.60
Credit registry  30  0.51  0.51  0.18  0.83  0.07
RuleofLaw  69  4.09  4.00  1.15  6.00  2.00
Corruption  69  3.24  3.00  1.11  6.00  1.32
Institutional  Development  73  0.10  -0.07  0.66  1.53  -1.14
GDP per capita  74  4971.57  2206.96  7712.29  30794.02  109.01
Private Credit  71  0.40  0 26  0.38  1.84  0.00
Foreign Bank Share  43  22.89  11.70  23.94  97.61  0.00
Public Bank Share  45  23.10  15.00  23 43  80.00  0.00
Inflation  74  0.13  0 08  0 16  0.86  0.00
Growth  74  0.02  0.02  0.02  0 07  -0.03
37Panel  3: Correlatlons between furm-Revel  varlinbRes
General  High  Special  Long-  Credit  Collateral  Bank  Bank official  Bank  Govemnment  Foreign  Exporter  Manufact  Services  Sales  Number of
financing  interest  connection  term  infonnation  bureaucracy  corruption  finance  uring  competitors
obstacle  rates  loans
High interest rates  0.33***  1
Special connection  0.30°°°  0a3S°°  I
Long-tenn loans  0.46°°°  0.45**  0.440"  I
Credit information  0.29°°°  0.29*°  0.370°°  0 46°°°  I
Collateral  0.36*°°  0.4 2***  0 4600o  0 42°°  0.33°°  I
Bank bureaucracy  0.2S°°°  0.4200°  0.51°°  0.36000  0 33eoo  0.58°°  1
Bank off conuption  0.26-°  0.27*0*  0.47***  0.40"O  0.3goo  0.28°°  0.35"OO  I
Bankfinance  -001  0.05°°°  0.01  -0.02  4001  0.07°°°  0.02  -0.10°°°  I
Government  0.05°°  -0. 0 3°°  4.08°°  -0.02  -0 04°°  -0.05°°°  4,05°°°  - 05°°°  4,04°°°  I
Foreign  4,.17°°°*  0. 09°¢  40.08°°°  40,11*  4003°  -0.11°°  40.06°°°  -0.09°°  0.10**  -0.06***  1
Exporter  0.06°°°  -0.01  -0 06°°  -0.03°°  0.03°  .0.04°°  -0.03°  -0.410°°  0 IS**  0.06°°°  0.24°°°  I
Manufacturing  0 02°  0.0500  -0.02  0.03**  0.04°°°  0.02  0.02  -0.05°°°  0.12*°*  0.0S**o  0 11°°  0.32°°°  I
Services  -4.10°°  -10°°°  -0.01  -0.09°°  -0.07°°  -0.05°°  40.04°°°  0 01  -0.07*  -0.06°°°  4.06°°  .0.260*  40.69°°°  I
Sales  -0.18°°  -009°°  -0.00  -0.13*o  -0.02  .0.03***  -0.03°  -0.410°°  0.31"  -0.21°°°  0.270°°  0.15°°°  008°  001  I
No. of competitors  0.09-°  0.09°°  0.02  0.09°°°  0.07*°°  0.04°°°  0.050°  0. 0OS°°  -0.16**  .0.08***  .10*0  .004*o  -009**  -0.01  .0.29°0°  I
Concentration  0  I0**  0.03 00  -0.03**  0.08*°*  0.07°°°  .003*0*  -0.07°°°  0.08°°°  -0.415°°  0.l  -0.03°o  0.01  -003°°  -006°°  -0.270°°  0.11°°°
38Panel C: Correlations between country-level variables
Foreign  Public
Fraction  Banking  Rule of  Institutional  GDP per  Private  Bank  Bank
Concentration  Restrict  denied  Freedom  Credit registry  Law  Cormption  Development  capita  Credit  Share  Share  Inflation
Restrict  030"*  1
Fraction denied  003  0.22  1
Banking Freedom  -0 39"**  426  -0.16  1
Credit  registry  4.04'.  0.24  -0.12  0.10  I
Rule of Law  0 08  -034*  -0.06'  027P  0.03  1
Conruption  0.08  4.31*  4.29*  0.29"  0.15  049"*  1
Institutional
Development  4.32*-*  -053*  -O11  0.53'*  Oil  0.71**  073"*  1
GDP per capita  4.40"'  4.47"'  -0.22  0.38"*  0.13  0.59**  0.56"*  0.79"' 
Private Credit  4.43"*  425'  0.11  0.33"'  -0.08  0.41"'  0.32"*  0.60**  0.66'*  1
ForeignBankSbare  035"  4.11  4.05  030"  020  0.05  009  0.14  4.15  4.24  1
Public Bank Share  012  0.32**  0.21  438"  -0.09  4.11I"'  4.34"  438"'  4.300  4.40'  4.33"  1
Inflation  014  0.42*'  4.12  4.10  -0.01  4.16"*  4 11  4.35*'  4.29*  4.39"*  4.08  0.46*  1
Growth  014  0.05  0.35  400  0.18  0.29*  0.31"  0.24"  0.09  0.03  0.14  0.10  431***
39Table III
Concentration,  Financing Obstacles and Access to Bank Finance
The regression estimated m columns  1-3 is. General  Financing Obstacle = a +  P  Government +  ,  Foreign +  P3 Exporter + P4 Manufactuiring +  ,6 Semvces + f6 Sales
+P No. of Competitors +  Inflaton +  f,Growth +  pis Concentration + . General Financing Obstacle Is  the response to the question "How problematic  is financing  for
the operation and growth of your business?" Answers vary between  I (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle),  and 4 (major obstacle).  Govenment and
Foreign are dununy variables  that take the value  I if the firm has goverment or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if  the
firm is an exporting  firm.  Manufactunng and Sevices  are industry dummues. Sales is the logarithm  of sales in USS. Number of Competitors is the loganthm of the
number of competitors the firm  has. Growth is the growth  rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the consumer price index.  Concentradon  is the share of the
largest three banks m total banking sector assets. Concennabon-BCL  is an alternative indicator of bank concentation,  measuring the deposits of the largest five banks
as share of total deposit m the banking system. Small, Medium and Large are dummy variables, mdicatng the size of the firm. Firms with 5 to 50 employees  are
defined as small, firms with 51  to 500 employees as medium and firms  with more than 500 employees as large. The regression  is run with ordered probit. The
regression  estimated in columns 4-6 is: Bank Finance = a +  01  Government +  fl  Foreign +  3  Exporter + ,4 Manufacturing + f6 Services +  N Sales +N No. of
Competitors +f6 Inflation + f6G rowth +  tio Concentration + e.  Bank Finance  is a dununy variable that takes on the value one if the firm receives bank finance, and zeo
otherwise  The regression is run as probit. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  P-values are reported in parentheses.
General  General  General
Financing  Financing  Fmancing  Bank
Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Bank Finance  Bank Finance  Finance
Govenment  0.062  0.105  0.060  -0.037  -0.189  -0.035
(0.160)  (0.023)**  (0.283)  (0.545)  (0.004)**S  (0.640)
Foreign  -0.352  -0.330  -0.322  -0.028  - 085  -0.033
(0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.627)  (0.141)  (0.633)
Exporter  -0.045  -0.023  -0.042  0.348  0.300  0.262
(0.136)  (0.459)  (0.263)  (0.000)***  (0.000)**  (0.000)**
Manufactunng  -0.074  -0.070  -0.112  0.109  0.120  0.151
(0.057)  (0.074)*  (0.024)**  (0.068)*  (0.045)**  (0.043)**
Services  -0.282  -0.292  -0.313  -0.055  0.007  0.014
(0.000)*e*  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.333)  (0.907)  (0.847)
Sales  -0 016  -0.014  -0.014  0.042  0.037  0.034
(0.000)***  (0.000)**4  (0.000)W**  (0.0o0)***  (0.000)***  (0.00O)*
Number of  Competitors  0.051  0.043  -0.026  -0.060  -0.043  0.037
(0.257)  (0.336)  (0.647)  (0.354)  (0.508)  (0.657)
Inflation  0.233  0.275  0.405  -0.064",  -0.131  -0.395
(0.024)0o  (0.009)***  (0.001)'**  (0.625)  (0.324)  (0.012)**
Growth  -6A95  -6.420  -5.507  3.018  3.048  3.010
(0 000)***  (0.000)0*0  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.003)***
Concentration  0.433  -0.481
(0.000)***  (0.000)***
Concentration BCL  0.239  -0.545
(0.006)***  (0.000)***
Concentration  Small  0.493  -0.729
(0.000)***  (0.000)**
Concentration*  Medium  0.434  -0.219
(0.000)***  (0.078)*
Concentration  Large  0.165  -0.046
(0.080)*  (0.751)
Constant  -0.451  -0.449  -0.267
(0000)***  (0000)***  (0.103)
Pseudo R
2 0.034  0.035  0.030  0.093  0.103  0.078
Observations  6716  6714  4429  4693  4692  3011
',**,*** indicate significance  levels of 10,5,  and I percent, respectively.
40Table IV
Concentration, Financing Obstacles and Access to Bank Finance -
Quantifying the Effect
Based on the regressions of  Table  111,  estimated probabilities of (i) ratng financmg as major obstacle to the operaton and growth of the enterpnses (Financing
Obstacle=4) and (ii) probability of financng investment with ban finance are presented  for the 25/, 50% and 75% percentiles of Concentration.  Estimated
probabilities are calculated for each enterpnse settng all vanables at its actual value, except for Bank Concentration, which is set at either the 25%, 50%/o or 75%
percentile of the sample. The probabilities shown are averages for all  firms in the sample or for firmis of the specific  size class.
Bank Concentration at  25% (0.46)  50% (0.61)  75% (0.78)  |Change beteen 25%  Based on regression
I  I  I  and 75% perfeDles
Average estimated probability that enterpnse will  rate financing  as major obstacle for opertion and growth
All enterprises  0.325  0.388  J  0.464  0.139  Table 111,I
Small enterpnses  0.333  0.406  1  0.492  0.158  Table til, 2
Medium enterpnses  0.339  0.403  0.479  0.139  Table 111,  2
Large enterpnses  0.275  0.299  0.328  0.053  Table 111,  2
Avenge estimated probability that enterpnse will finance their investment with bank  finance
All enterprises  0.452  0.381  0.298  -0.154  Table 111, 4
Small enterprses  0.399  0.291  0.165  -0.234  Table 111,  5
Medium  enterprises  0.457  0.425  0.387  -0.070  Table 111,5
Large enterpnses.  0.573  0.566  0.558  -0.015  Table  111, 5
41Tabile V
Coineentrationn,  FanancinLmg  bDastzeDes and Access to I3mlk Figannce -
Controfing for the Regulldoim  of the  13  Rdimng Sectonr
The regression estimated in columns 1-4 is: General Fnancing Obstacle  = a +  p, Govemment +  f6 Foreign +  03- Exporter + 04 Manufacturing +  p, Services + 06 Sales
+fNo. of Competitors +f6lnflation +  IsG rowth + PloConcentration +  Pi,  Regulation +  F. General  Financing Obstacle  is the response to the question "How
problematic  is financig for the operation and growth of  your business?" Answers vary between  I (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4
(major obstacle). Govemment and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value  I if the firm has govemment or foreign ownership and zero if not  Exporter is a
dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Manufacturing and Services  are industry dummies.  Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$. Number of
Competitors is the logarithm of the number of  competitors the firm has. Growth  is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation  is the log difference of the consumer price  mdex.
Concentration is the share of the largest three banks in  total banking sector assets. Regulation is one of four regulatory variables. Restnct is an indicator of the degree  to
which banks'  activities are restricted outside the credit and deposit busiess  Fraction denied is the share of bank license applications rejected. Banlung Freedom is a
general indicator of the absence of govemment  interference in the banking sector. Credit regtstry indicator is a summary variable of the amount of information and the
number of  stitutions that have access to borrower iformation from credit registries  in a country.  The regression is run with ordered probit. The regression  estmated
in columns 5-8 is. Bank Finance=ac+  p1 Government + f  Foreign +  Exporter+  04Manufacturing+  fsServices+ p6Sales+07No. of Competitors +fslnflation +p
Growth +  P 1 Concentration + Pi  Regulation + F.  Bank Finance is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm receives bank finance, and zero The
regression  is run as probit. Detailed  variable defiitions and sources are given in the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses.
General  General  General  General
Financing  Financing  Financing  Financing  Bank
Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Finance  Bank Finance  Bank Finance  Bank Finance
Govermment  0.047  -0.009  0.059  0.099  -0.013  -0.069  -0.034  -0.033
(0.381)  (0.877)  (0.182)  (0.165)  (O 855)  (0.421)  (0.585)  (0.718)
Foreign  -0 315  -0.328  -0.352  -0.410  -0 086  -0.077  -0.042  -0.041
(0 000)*00  (0  0()°°°  (0.0W0)°*  (0.000)°°°  (0.181)  (0.258)  (0.463)  (0.589)
Exporter  -0.036  -0.058  -0.026  0 006  0.298  0.265  0.320  0.260
(0.329)  (0.141)  (0.392)  (0.904)  (0.000)0-*  (0.(000)0  (O 000)**  (0.000)**
Manufactiring  -0.084  -0.054  -0.092  -0.198  0.145  0.221  0.124  0.112
(0.079)°  (0.320)  (0.019)00  (0.002)000  (0.039)0°  (0.008)000  (0 039)**  (0.169)
Services  -0.277  -0.220  -0.278  -0 407  -0.006  -0.002  -0.053  0.048
(0.0O0)003  (O  00O)***  (O 000)°°°  (0.000)000  (0.923)  (0.978)  (0.354)  (0.540)
Sales  -0 021  -0.012  -0.016  -0.021  0.036  0.033  0.042  0.037
(0.0O0)***  (  0000)00  (0.000)*Oc  (0.000)000  (0.000)**0  (0.000)3°°  (0.000)0°°  (O 000)°°°
Number of Competitors  -0.014  -0021  0.025  0.036  -0.016  -0.099  -0.063  0 115
(0 797)  (0.717)  (0.587)  (0.602)  (0.843)  (0.273)  (0.333)  (0 228)
Inflation  0.188  0.683  0.253  0.187  -0.397  -0.678  -0058  -0.613
(0  176)  (0.000)000  (0.015)*0  (0.217)  (0.031)**  (0.001)°°°  (0.651)  (0.001)000
Growth  -7.239  -6 355  -6.256  -8.092  2  571  2.213  2.361  6.532
(0 000)°°°  (0.000)°°°  (0.000)°°°  (0.000)°°0  (0 017)°°  (0 052)0  (0.006)000  (0.000)000
Concentration  0.171  0.263  0.226  0 521  -0.132  -0.186  -0.122  -0.393
(0.080)0  (0.019)00  (0004)°°°  (0.000)°°°  (0.385)  (0.298)  (0.333)  (0.017)°°
Restrict  0.041  0.005
(0 000)°°°  (0.724)
Fraction  denied  0.107  0.007
(0.026)°°  (0 923)
Bankng Freedom  -0.165  0.215
(0.000)000  I  (0.000)°°°
Credit  Registry  0.209  -0.046
(0.092)°  (0.803)
Constant  -0.568  -0.361  -1.345  -0.440
(0.000)0°°  (0.037)00  (0.000)"0°  (0.010)°°
0.034  0.027  0.037  0.050  0.071  0.077  0.101  0.092
Observations  4783  3926  6716  3254  3335  2542  4693  2460
0,00,000  indicate significance  levels of 10,5, and  t percent,  respectively.
42Table VI
Concentration, Financing Obstacles and Access to Bank Finance -
The Interaction with the Regulation of the Banking Sector
The regression estimated  in columns  1-4 is. General  Financing Obstacle = aA  +  0, Govemment +  f6 Foreign +  P3 Exporter + P4 Manufacturing  + ,  Services +  P6 Sales
+p7No. of Conipetitors+p,lnflation +  P,Growth +  p, 1 Concentration +  pi,  Regulation + 0i2 Concentration*Regulation+  C. General  Financing Obstacle is the response
to the question "How problematic is financing for the operaton  and growth of your business?" Answers vary between  I (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle),  3 (moderate
obstacle),  and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign  are dummy variables that take the value I if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not.
Exporter is a dummy  variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies. Sales is the logarithm of sales in US$.
Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of competitors the firm has  Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the consumer
price mdex.  Concentration  is the share of the largest three banks in  total banking sector assets  Regulation  is one of four regulatory vanables  Restrict is an indicator of
the degree to which banks'  activities are restrcted outside the credit and deposit business.  Fraction denied  is the share of bank license  applications rejected. Banking
Freedom is a general indicator of the absence of government  interference in the banking sector. Credit registry indicator is a summary variable of the amount of
information and the number of institutions that have access to borrower mformation from credit registries in acountry.  The regression  is run with ordered probi.  The
regression estimated in columns 5-8  is: Bank Finance = a +  0, Government +  fl  Foreign +  P3  Exporter + fl4  Manufacturng +  05 Services +  p6 Sales +p, No. of
Competitors +  Inflabon +  09 Growth +  P 1 sConcentration +  pi,  Regulation+  012 Concentration*Regulation  + r.-  Bank Finance is a dummy variable that takes on the
value one if the firm receives bank finance, and zero The regression is run  as probiLt.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  P-values are
reported in parentheses.
General  General  General  General
Financing  Financing  Fmancing  Financing
Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Bank Finance  Bank Finance  Bank Fmance  Bank  Finance
Concentration  -2.568  0.289  0.955  2 241  2.791  -0.132  -1.092  1.353
(0000)**  (0.036)**  (0.001)t**  (0.000)***  (0000)***  (0.551)  (0019)**  (0.059)
Restrict  -0.088  0 152
(0.000)***  (0.000)***
Concentration*Restnct  0.274  -0.302
(0.000)*  (O 0O0)***
Fraction  denied  0.156  0.116
(0 367)  (0.664)
Concentration*Fraction  denied  -0.098  -0.214
(0.762)  (0.671)
Banking Freedom  -0.024  0.027
(0 676)  (0 772)
Concentration'Bankmg  Freedom  -0.236  0.302
(0.008)***  (0 030)**
Credit Registry  1.614  1.442
(0.000)***  (0 022)**
Concentration*Credit  Registry  -3.133  -3.222
(0.000)**  (0 013)*
0.037  0.027  0.038  0.052  0.077  0.077  0.102  0.094
Observations  4783  3926  6716  3254  3335  2542  4693  2460
,  indicate significance levels of 10,5,  and I percent, respectively
4311Table VIII
Concentration,  Financing Obstacles and Access  to Bank Finance -
Conitrolling for the Institutional Environment
The regression  estimated in columns  1-4 is- General Financing Obstacle = a +  PI Government + X6  Foreign +  06 Exporter + p4 Manufacturing + P  Services +  P6 Sales
+f7No. of Competitors +Ps Inflation +  09Growth + PloConcentration +  Pni  Institution +  e.  General Financing  Obstacle is the response to the question "How
problematic is financing for the operation  and growth of  your business?" Answers vary between I (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4
(major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value  I if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a
dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting  firm.  Manufacturing  and Services are industry dummies.  Sales is the logarithm of sales in USS.  Number of
Competitors is the logarithm of  the number of competitors  the firm has. Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the consumer prie index.
Concentration is the share of the largest three banks in total banking sector assets. Institution is one of four variables. Rule of Law is the degree to which citzens trust
its country's legal system.  Corruption indicates the degree  to which  there is no corruption in a country. Instutdonal Development is an average of six indicators
measuring voice and accountability, control of corrupdon, regulatory quality, political stability,  rule of law, and government efficiency.  GDP per capita is real GDP per
capita.  The regression is rUn  with ordered probit. The regression estimated  in columns 5-8 is: Banak  Finance = a +  ,1 Government + ,h Foreign +  JI  Exporter + p4
Manufacturing +  sServices +  6Sales+0,No. of Competitors4+pinflation+  09Growth + p,oConcentration + p  Institution + e.. Bank Finance is adummy variable
that takes on the value one if the firm receives bank finance, and zero Tbe regression is run as  probit. Detailed variable defmitions and sources are given in the
appendix.  P-values are reported in partheses.
General  General  General  General
Financing  Financing  Financing  Financing
Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Bank Finance  Bank Finance  Bank Finance  Bank Finance
Government  0.052  -0.005  0.064  0.061  -0.059  -0.063  -0.037  -0.041
(0.275)  (0.922)  (0.145)  (0.164)  (0.370)  (0.344)  (0.548)  (0.503)
Foreign  -0.370  -0 382  -0.366  -0.363  -0.059  -0 060  -0.032  -0.033
(0.000)000  (0.000)Oes  (0.000)0es  (0.000)000  (0.308)  (0.299)  (0578)  (0.562)
Exporter  -0.055  -0.040  -0.004  -0.021  0.299  0.298  0.314  0315
(0.081)0  (0.204)  (0.897)  (0.484)  (0.000)o*  (0.000)°°°  (0.000)000  (0.000)000
Manufacturng  -0.081  -0.077  -0.077  -0080  0.131  0.133  0.128  0.134
(0.046)**  (0 059)°  (0.048)00  (0.040)0°  (0.038)°°  (0.036)°°  (0.032)°°  (0.026)°0
Services  -0.257  -0.227  -0.245  -0.239  -0 039  40.038  -0.058  -0.051
(0.000)000  (0.000)***  (0.000)°°0  (0.000)0°0  (0.511)  (0 525)  (0.307)  (0.366)
Sales  -0.019  -0.015  -0.014  -0.015  0.038  0.039  0.041  0.040
(0.000)(00  (0.000)0°°  (0.000)°°°  (0.000)000  (0.000)000  (0.000)000  (0.000)000  (0.000)0**
Number of  Competitors  0.021  -0.071  0.011  -0.012  -0.018  -0.020  -0.054  -0.066
(0 655)  (0.148)  (0.815)  (0.802)  (0.800)  (0.782)  (0.399)  (0.306)
Inflation  0.024  0.157  -0.156  0.179  -0.263  -0.248  0.122  -0.017
(0.821)  (0.133)  (0.137)  (0.083)*  (0.057)°  (0.065)0  (0.356)  (0.896)
Growth  -5.310  -2.290  4.247  -5.296  2.872  2.836  2.242  2.148
(0.000)°*0  (0.002)**0  (0.000)0oo  (0.000)00  (0.003)000  (0.006)***  (0.010)000  (0.013)°°
Concentration  0.479  0549  0.155  0.062  -0150  -0.248  -0.415  -0.272
(0.000)0°°  (0.000)***  (0.048)00  (0.446)  (0.043)*0  (0.046)°°  (0 001)*00  (0.028)00
Rule of Law  -0.120  -0 011
(0.000)°°°  (0.578)
Corruption  -0.208  -0.004
(0.000)°°°  (0.822)
Institutional Development  -0.377  0.165
(0.000)0°0  (0.000)°°°
GDP per capita  -0.146  0.096
(0.000)000  (0.000)*00
Constant  -0.455  -0.493  -0.514  -1.303
(0.002)00°  (0000)0°0  (0.000)000  (0 000)000
0.037  0.046  0.047  0.041  0.077  0.077  0.098  0.097
Observations  6111  6111  6687  6716  4135  4135  4673  4693
0,00,0*,  indicate  significance levels of 10,5, and I percent, respectively.
44Table VIII
Concentration, Financing Obstacles and Access to Bank Finance -
The Interaction with the Institutional Environment
The regression estimated in columns  1-4 is: General  Financing Obstacle = a+  Govermnent+  f6 Foreign +  03Exporter+  fManufacturing+  fiServices +  N 6Sales
+j7No. of Competitors +,s Inflation + f,Growth +  ploConcentration +  p  Institution +  Pl2 Concentrationlstution+ E. General Financing Obstacle is the response to
the question "How problematic is financtng for the operation  and growth of your bustness?" Answers vary between  I (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate
obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign  are dummy variables that take the value  I if the firm has govermment or foreign ownership and zero if noL
Exporter is a dummy variable that  ndicates if the firm is an exporting  firm.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies.  Sales is the logarithm of sales in USS.
Number of Competitors is the logarithm of the number of  competitors the firn has. Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation  is the log difference  of the consumer
price index.  Concentration  is the share of the largest three banks in total banking sector assets. Institution is one of four variables.  Rule of Law is the degree to whicb
citizens  rust ita country's legal system.  Corruption  indicates the degree to wbich there is no corruption in a country. Instutional Development is an average of six
indicators measuring voice and accountability, control of corruption, regulatory  quality, political stability, rule of law, and government efficiency.  GDP per capita is
real GDP per capita.  The regression  is run with ordered probit. The regression estiuated in columns 5-8 is. Bank Finance  - a +  p Government +  f6 Foreign + f6
Exporter+  04Manufactunng+ psServices +  5eSales +pNo. of Competitors +flnflation + ,  Growth +  p,iConcentation +  p lnstitution+  512
Concentrationlnstitution  + e.- Bank Fmance is a dummy variable  that takes on the value one if the firm receives bank finance,  and zero The regression  is rtn as probit.
Detailed varnable  definitions and sources are given in the appendix  P-values  are reported in parentheses.
General  General  General  General
Financing  Financing  Fmancing  Financing
Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Bank Fnance  Bank Finance  Bank Fmance  Bank Finance
Concentration  1.357  1.789  0.153  0.836  0.140  -1.419  -0.383  -2.341
(0.000)'0  (0.000)'*  (0 051))  (0.030)*  (0.756)  (0.000)*  (0.002)0  (0.00l)*
RuleofLaw  -0.014  0.036
(0.700)  (0.523)
Concentration*Rule of Law  -0.217  -0.097
(0.002)***  (0.371)
Corruption  0.009  -0.214
(0.827)  (0.001)**
Concentration*Corruption  -0.398  0.381
(0.000)***  (0.000)***
Institutional Development  -0.215  -0.187
(0.00l)***  (0.058)*
Concentration
5lnstitutional  -0.292  0.606
Development  (0.006)***  (0.000)**
GDP per capita  -0.088  -0.060
(0.004)0*$  (0.275)
Concentration*GDP  per capita  -0.104  0 270
(0.038)'  (0.002)*
0.037  0.048  0.048  0.041  0.077  0.079  0.100  0.098
Observations  6111  6111  6687  6716  4135  4135  4673  4693
indicate significance levels of 10,5, and I percent, respectively.
45Table IX
Concentration, Financing Obstacles and Access to Bank Finance -
Controlling for the Development and Structure of the Banking Sector
The regression estimated in columns 1-3 is: General  Financing Obstacle - a +  ,1 Government +  I2 Foreign +  03Exporter + f4Manufacturing +  ,6 Services +  06Sales
+p7No.  of Competitors +f51nflation +  pgGrowth +  pConcentrtion + pi Bank +  E. Gener  Financing Obstacle Is  the response to the question "How problematic  is
financing for the opestion and growth of your business?" Answers valy between  I (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate  obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle).
Government and Foreign are dummy variables that take the value I if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not  Exporter is a dummy vanable that
indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummes.  Sales is the logarithm of  sales in USS. Number of Competitors is the
logarithm of the number of competitors tbe fihn has. Growth  is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference of the consumer pnrce index.  Concentration is
the share of the largest three banks in total banking sector assets. Bank is one of three variables. Private Credit is claims on the private sector by financial institubons as
share of GDP. Forign Bank Share is the sbare of assets in banks that are majority foreign owned. Public Bank Sbare  is the share of assets in banks that are majority
state-owned. The regression is run with ordered probit The regression  estimated in columns 4-6 is: Bank Finance = a +  01 Govemment +  f6 Foreign +  fl  Exporter + 0
Manufacturing+  PsSrvices+  p6Sales+p7No.  of  Competitors +IInflation+ PgGrowth+  ,oConcentration+  p  Bank+  E..  BankFinance  isadummlyvarnablethat
takes on the value one if the fiun  receives bank finance, and zero The regression is run as probit  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  P-
values are reported in parentheses.
General  Generl  General
Financng  Financing  Financing
Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Bank Finance  Bank Funance  Bank Finance
Govenment  0.047  0.023  0.035  -0.054  0.021  0.014
(0.306)  (0.682)  (0.523)  (0.404)  (0.774)  (0.846)
Foreign  -0.363  -0.335  -0.348  -0.047  -0.057  -0.047
(0.000)**'  (0.000)*"  (0.000)e**  (0.418)  (0.404)  (0.479)
Exporter  -0.044  -0.004  0.017  0.323  0.248  0.249
(0.155)  (0.925)  (0.647)  (0.000)00*  (0.000)*  (0.000)"'
Manufacturing  -0.083  -0.132  -0.135  0.089  0.183  0.173
(0.039)00  (0.009)***  (0.006)***  (0.152)  (0.012)**  (0.015)**
Services  -0.277  -0.301  -0.292  -0.068  0.001  -0 001
(0.000)"*  (0.000)***  (0.000)°*  (0.244)  (0.988)  (0.989)
Sales  -0.012  -0 018  -0.016  0.042  0.044  0.035
(0.000)***  (0.000)**'  (0.000)***  (0.000)oo *  (0.000)***  (0.000)**
Number of Competitors  0.022  0.031  0.015  -0.028  0.010  -0.001
(0.632)  (0.579)  (0.797)  (0.675)  (0 903)  (0.986)
Inflation  0.123  0.434  0.369  -0.209  -0.257  -0.125
(0.255)  (0.001)**  (0.005)*es  (0.122)  (0.133)  (0.477)
Growth  -7.072  -8.457  -8.829  3.173  4.365  4.222
(0.000)**  (0.000)ee  (0.ooo)Se  (0.000)*¢*  (0.000)***  (0.000)***
Concentration  0.352  0.223  0.253  -0.310  40.066  -0.129
(0.000)***  (0.045)"  (0.017)**  (0.01 1)**  (0.678)  (0.429)
Private Credit  -0.193  -0.065
(0.000)"*  (0.390)
Foreign Bank Share  -0.001  0.002
(0.095)e  (0.072)*
Public Bank Share  0.003  -0.004
(0.002)0*e  (0.002)***
Constant  -.476  40.730  -0.484
(0.000)*°'  (0.000)'*'  (0.002)***
0 035  0.038  0.041  0.084  0.083  0.081
Observations  6346  4405  4578  4357  3099  3226
'  indicate significance  levels of 10,5, and I pereent, respectively.
46Table X
Concentration, Financing Obstacles and Access to Bank Finance -
The Interaction  with the Ownership  Structure of the Banking Sector
The regression  estimated in columns  1-3  is: General Financing  Obstacle  = a +  Pi Government +  f6 Foreign +  f6 Exporter + Pi  Manufactunng +  fs Services +  P6  Sales
+>No. of Competitors +pglnflation +  f,Growth +  P,Concentration+  ,,Bank+  5 12Concentration  Bank +  a.  General Financng Obstacle is the response to the
question "How problematic  is financing for the operation and growth of your business?" Answers  vary between I (no obstacle),  2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate
obstacle),  and 4 (major obstacle). Government and Foreign are dunnmy variables that take the value I if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if noL
Exporter is a dunmmy vanable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firmL  Manufacturing  and Services are industry dummies. Sales  is the logarithm of sales in USS.
Number of  Competitors  is the logarithm of the number of competitors the  firm has. Growth is the growth rate of GDP.  Inflation is the log difference  of the consumner
price index.  Concentration is the share of the largest three banks  in total banking sector assets  Bank is one of three variables.  Private Credit  is claims on the private
sector by financial institutions as share of GDP. Foreign Bank Share is the share of assets in banks that are majority foreign  owned.  Public Bank Share is the share of
assets in banks that are  majority state-owned.The  regression is run with ordered probit The regression estimated in columns 4-6 is: Bank Finance = a +  ,  Govemment
+  f  Foreign +  % 3Exporter+  04Manufacturing+  ,sServices+  fSales+>No. of  Competitors +  Inflation +  N Growth + ,oConcentration  +  p  Bank+  012
Concentration  *Bank + F.. Bank Finance is a dunmmy variable that takes on the value one if the firm receives bank finance, and zero The regression  is run as probit.
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given m the appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses.
General  General  General
Financing  Financing  Financing
Obstacle  Obstacle  Obstacle  Bank Finance  Bank Finance  Bank Finance
Concentration  0.273  0434  -0.128  -0.107  -0.147  0.004
(0.007)0''  (0 001)"'  (0.385)  (0.489)  (0.483)  (0.986)
Private Credit  -0.293  0.195
(0.001)''*  (0.188)
ConcentrationVPrivate  Credit  0.220  -0.618
(0.218)  (0.037)"
Foreign  Bank Share  0.005  0.000
(0.055)'  (0.990)
Concentration*Foreign  Bank Share  -0.010  0.004
(0.008)"'  (0.544)
Public Bank Share  -0.004  -0.002
(0.049)**  (0.608)
Concentration  0 014  -0.004
Public Bank Share  (0.000)***  (0.422)
0.036  0.039  0042  0085  0.083  0.081
Observations  6346  4405  4578  4357  3099  3226
,","'indicate significance  levels of 10,5, and I percent, respectively.
47Table XI
Concentration, Financing Obstacles and Individual Financing Obstacles
The regression  estimated  in Panel A is: Financing Obstacle = a +  1  Government +  02 Foreign +  P3 Exporter +  04 Manufacturng +  5  Services +  6 Sales +fNo.  of
Competitors +Is Inflation +  f6 Growth +  PioConcentration +  a.  Financing Obstacle is the response to one of seven questions. Answers vary between  I  (no obstacle),  2.
(minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Govemment  and Foreign are dumtny variables that take the value I  if  the firm has govemment or
foreign ownership and zero if noL  Exporter is a dummy vanable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Manufacturing and Services are industry dummies.
Sales  is the logarithm of sales in USS. Number of Competitors is the loganthm of  the number of competitors the firm has. Growth is the growth rate of  GDP.  Inflation
is the log difference of the consumer price index.  Concentration  is the share of the largest three banks in total banking sector assets.  The regression  estimated m Panel
B is: Financmg Obstacle =a+ ,  Govermment+  f6 Foreign + liExporter+ P 4Manufacturing+  I3Services +  06Sales+7No.  of Competitors +0stnflation+  CGrowth
+  PIoConcenbation +  p , Institutonal  Development +  Ps2 Concenbation'lnstitutional  Development +  a The regression  is rnm with ordered probt. Detailed variable
definitions and sources are given in the appendix.  P-values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A
High interest  Special  Long-term  Credit  Bank  Bank official
rates  connection  loans  information  Collateral  bureaucracy  corruption
Government  -0.159  -0.257  -0.178  -0.110  -0.180  -0.150  -0.249
(0.001)'*'  (0.000)***  (0.000)ee  (0.018)0*  (0.000)***  (0.00l)4*  (0.000)***
Foreign  -0.222  -0.211  -0.216  -0 090  -0.283  -0.122  -0.168
(o.000)**  (0.000)*Qe  (0.000)o**  (0.014)0*  (0.000)***  (o00'J'J)*  (o.o0o)**
Exporter  0.026  -0.079  -0.000  0.052  -0.025  -0.024  -0.162
(0.405)  (0.008)0e0  (0.994)  (0.0 9 6)e  (0 401)  (0.410)  (O.000)***
Manufacturing  -0 023  -0.057  -0.055  0.028  -0.019  -0.021  -0.044
(0.588)  (0.147)  (0.281)  (0.505)  (0.623)  (0.593)  (0336)
Services  -0.261  -0.116  -0.227  -0.137  -0.154  -0.131  -0.052
(0.000)***  (0.003)000  (0.000)**  (0.001)000  (0.000)*P*  (0.001)000  (0.234)
Sales  -0.012  -0 004  -0.011  -0.004  -0 004  -0.006  -0.010
(0.000)''@  (0.115)  (0000)0*  (0.105)  (0.052)0  (0011)**  (0.000)0**
Number of  0148  -0004  0072  0.199  0.051  0.095  0.133
Competitors  (0.002)**-  (0.926)  (0.172)  (0.000)*°°  (0.246)  (0.031)°°  (0.014)0*
Inflation  0.121  -0.352  0.180  -0 616  0.027  0 081  -0.062
(0.330)  (0.001)0*9  (0  132)  (0.000)**°  (0.792)  (0.416)  (0.591)
Growth  -6.854  -5.237  -8.219  -6.757  -5.145  -3.362  -6.079
(0.000)**o  (0.000)0*e  (0.000)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)**0  (0.000)*o*  (0.000)0u
Concentration  0.177  -0045  0.501  0.465  -0.104  -A08  0.474
(0.019)"  (0.542)  (0.000)*¢*  (0000)900  (0.160)  (0.000)***  (0.000)¢o
Observations  6822  6461  5382  5955  6492  6629  5761
Panel B
High mterest  Special  Long-term  Credit  Bank  Bank official
rates  connection  loans  information  Collateral  bureaucracy  corruption
Concentration  -0.230  -0.257  0.120  0.208  -0.176  -0.517  0.120
(0.006)***  (0.001)0**  (0.230)  (0.010)**  (0.023)**  (0.ooo)0e  (0  179)
Institutional Development  -0.596  -0.055  -0.548  -0.055  -0.072  0.022  -0 294
(0.000)***  (0.379)  (0.000)"*  (0.402)  (0.225)  (0.721)  (0.000)9**
ConcentrationOlnstitutional  0.264  -0.361  0.020  -0.481  -0.065  -0.206  -0.274
Development  (0.013)**  (0.001)00°  (0.860)  (0.000)***  (0.524)  (0.049)**  (0.032)**
Observations  6822  6461  5382  5955  6492  6629  5761
¶",  indicate significance  levels of 10,5, and I percent, respectively.
48ADpendix: Variables and Sources
Variable  Definifton  Original source
GDP per capita  Real per capita GDP, average  1995-99  World Development
Indicators
Growth  Growth rate of GDP, average  1995-99  World Development
Indicators
Inflation rate  Log difference of Consumer Price Index  International  Financial
Statistics (IFS), line 64
Private Credit  {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t)  + F(t-l)/P_e(t-l)]}/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)],  where F  IFS
is credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions
to the private sector (lines 22d and 42d), GDP is line 99b, P_e is
end-of period CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average CPI for the
year.
Law and Order  Measure  of the law and order tradition of a country. It is an  International  Country Risk
average over  1995-97.  It ranges from 6, strong law and order  Guide (ICRG).
tradition, to 1,  weak law and order tradition.
Corruption  Measure of corruption in government. It ranges from I to 6 and  International  Country Risk
is an average over  1995-97.  Lower scores indicate  that "high  Guide (ICRG).
government officials are likely to demand special payments"  and
"illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels
of govemment"  in the form of "bribes connected with import and
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy
protection,  or loans."
Institutional Development Average value of six indicators measuring voice and  Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-
accountability, political  stability, regulatory quality, govemment  Lobaton (2001)
effectiveness, control of corruption and rule of law.  Each of
these indicators,  in tum is constructed from a wide array of
survey indicators  in the respective area.
Restrict  Degree to which banks' activities  are restricted outside the credit Barth, Caprio and Levine
and deposit business  (2001)
Fraction denied  Share of bank license applications rejected.  If there were no  Barth, Caprio and Levine
applications, the value is one  (2001)
Foreign bank share  Share of banking assets in banks that are majority owned by  Barth,  Caprio and Levine
foreign shareholders  (2001)
Public bank share  Share of banking assets in banks that are majority owned by the  Barth, Caprio and Levine
government  (2001)
Banking freedom  General  indicator of the absence of govermnent interference  in  Heritage Foundation
the banking sector
Ctedit Registry  Average  of four variables that indicate (i)  whether the credit  Galindo and Miller (2001)
registry offers  only negative or also positive information about
borrowers,  (ii) the amount of information available about
borrowers, (iii) which institutions have access to the data, and
(iv) whether information  is available for each loan or only
aggregated for each borrower.  The indicator  is normalized
between zero and one, with higher values indicating more
49information being available  to more institutions.
Government  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any govermnent  World Business Environment
agency or state body has a financial  stake in the ownership of the Survey (WBES)
firm,  zero otherwise.
Foreign  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any foreign  World Business Environment
company or individual  has a financial  stake in the ownership of  Survey (WBES)
the firm, zero otherwise.
Exporter  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm exports, zero World Business Environment
otherwise.  Survey (WBES)
Manufacturing  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the  World Business Environment
manufacturing  industry, zero otherwise.  Survey (WBES)
Services  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the  World Business Environment
service industry, zero otherwise.  Survey (WBES)
No. of Competitors  Regarding your firm's major product line, how many competitors World Business Environment
do you face in your market?  Survey (WBES)
Firm size dummies  A firm is defined as small if it has between 5 and 50 employees,  World Business Environment
medium size if it has between 51  and 500 employees and large if Survey (WBES)
it has more than 500 employees.
Sales  Logarithm of firm sales  World Business Enviromment
Survey (WBES)
General Financing  How problematic  is financing for the operation and growth of  World Business Environment
Obstacle  your business:  no obstacle  (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate  Survey (WBES)
obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Collateral  Are collateral requirements of banks/fmnancial  institutions no  World Business Environment
obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate  obstacle (3) or a  Survey (WBES)
major obstacle (4)?
Bank bureaucracy  Is bank paperwork/bureaucracy  no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle  World Business Environment
(2), a moderate obstacle  (3) or a major obstacle (4)?  Survey (WBES)
High interest rates  Are high interest  rates no obstacle  (1), a minor obstacle (2), a  World Business Environment
moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?  Survey (WBES)
Special connections  Is the need of of special connections  with banks/financial  World Business Environment
institutions no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate  Survey (WBES)
obstacle  (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Credit mfornation  Is inadequate credit/financial  information  on costumners no  World Busmess Environment
obstacle  (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate  obstacle (3) or a  Survey (WBES)
major obstacle (4)?
Long-term  Is the access to long-term finance no obstacle (1), a minor  World Business Enviromment
loans  obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle  (3) or a major obstacle (4)?  Survey (WBES)
Bank official corruption  Is the corruption of bank officials no obstacle  (1), a minor  World Business Enviromment
obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?  Survey (WBES)
Bank Finance  Dummy variable that takes on value one if firm has financed its  World Business Environment
investment with loans from commercial banks, zero otherwise  Survey (WBES)
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